Short answer: AI won’t replace cybersecurity end to end, but it will take over sizable portions of repetitive SOC and security engineering work. Used as a noise reducer and summariser - with a human override - it speeds triage and prioritisation; treated as an oracle, it can introduce risky false certainty.
Key takeaways:
Scope: AI replaces tasks and workflows, not the profession itself or the accountability.
Toil reduction: Use AI for alert clustering, concise summaries, and log-pattern triage.
Decision ownership: Keep humans for risk appetite, incident command, and hard tradeoffs.
Misuse resistance: Design for prompt injection, poisoning, and adversarial evasion attempts.
Governance: Enforce data boundaries, auditability, and contestable human overrides in tooling.

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The “replace” framing is the trap 😅
When people say “Can AI replace Cybersecurity”, they tend to mean one of three things:
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Replace analysts (no humans needed)
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Replace tools (one AI platform does everything)
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Replace outcomes (fewer breaches, less risk)
AI is strongest at replacing repetitive effort and compressing decision time. It’s weakest at replacing accountability, context, and judgment. Security isn’t just detection - it’s thorny tradeoffs, business constraints, politics (ugh), and human behavior.
You know how it goes - the breach wasn’t “a lack of alerts.” It was a lack of someone believing the alert mattered. 🙃
Where AI already “replaces” cybersecurity work (in practice) ⚙️
AI is already taking over certain categories of work, even if the org chart still looks the same.
1) Triage and alert clustering
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Grouping similar alerts into a single incident
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De-duplicating noisy signals
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Ranking by likely impact
This matters because triage is where humans lose their will to live. If AI cuts the noise by even a little, it’s like turning down a fire alarm that’s been screaming for weeks 🔥🔕
2) Log analysis and anomaly detection
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Spotting suspicious patterns at machine speed
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Flagging “this is unusual compared to baseline”
It’s not perfect, but it can be valuable. AI is like a metal detector on a beach - it beeps a lot, and sometimes it’s a bottle cap, but occasionally it’s a ring 💍… or a compromised admin token.
3) Malware and phishing classification
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Classifying attachments, URLs, domains
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Detecting lookalike brands and spoofing patterns
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Automating sandbox verdict summaries
4) Vulnerability management prioritization
Not “which CVEs exist” - we all know there are too many. AI helps answer:
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Which are likely exploitable here. EPSS (FIRST)
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Which are exposed externally
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Which map to valuable assets. CISA KEV Catalog
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Which should be patched first without setting the org on fire. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 (Enterprise Patch Management)
And yes, humans could do that too - if time was infinite and nobody ever took holidays.
What makes a good version of AI in cybersecurity 🧠
This is the part people skip, and then they blame “AI” like it’s a single product with feelings.
A good version of AI in cybersecurity tends to have these traits:
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High signal-to-noise discipline
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It must reduce noise, not mint extra noise with fancy phrasing.
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Explainability that helps in practice
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Not a novel. Not vibes. Real clues: what it saw, why it cares, what changed.
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Tight integration with your environment
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IAM, endpoint telemetry, cloud posture, ticketing, asset inventory… the unglamorous stuff.
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Human override built in
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Analysts need to correct it, tune it, and sometimes ignore it. Like a junior analyst that never sleeps but occasionally panics.
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Security-safe data handling
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Clear boundaries on what gets stored, trained, or retained. NIST AI RMF 1.0
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Resilience against manipulation
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Attackers will try prompt injection, poisoning, and deception. They always do. OWASP LLM01: Prompt Injection UK AI Cyber Security Code of Practice
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Let’s be frank - a lot of “AI security” fails because it’s trained to sound certain, not to be correct. Confidence is not a control. 😵💫
The parts AI struggles to replace - and it matters more than it sounds 🧩
Here’s the uncomfortable truth: cybersecurity isn’t only technical. It’s socio-technical. It’s humans plus systems plus incentives.
AI struggles with:
1) Business context and risk appetite
Security decisions are rarely “is it bad.” They’re more like:
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Whether it’s severe enough to stop revenue
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Whether it’s worth breaking the deployment pipeline
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Whether the exec team will accept downtime for it
AI can assist, but it can’t own that. Someone signs their name on the decision. Someone gets the 2am call 📞
2) Incident command and cross-team coordination
During real incidents, the “work” is:
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Getting the right people in the room
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Aligning on facts without panic
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Managing comms, evidence, legal concerns, customer messaging NIST SP 800-61 (Incident Handling Guide)
AI can draft a timeline or summarize logs, sure. Replacing leadership under pressure is… optimistic. It’s like asking a calculator to run a fire drill.
3) Threat modeling and architecture
Threat modeling is part logic, part creativity, part paranoia (healthy paranoia, mostly).
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Enumerating what could go wrong
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Anticipating what an attacker would do
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Picking the cheapest control that changes the attacker’s math
AI can suggest patterns, but the real value comes from knowing your systems, your people, your shortcuts, your peculiar legacy dependencies.
4) Human factors and culture
Phishing, credential reuse, shadow IT, sloppy access reviews - these are human problems wearing technical costumes 🎭
AI can detect, but it can’t fix why the org behaves the way it does.
Attackers use AI too - so the playing field tilts sideways 😈🤖
Any discussion of replacing cybersecurity has to include the obvious: attackers aren’t standing still.
AI helps attackers:
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Write more convincing phishing messages (less broken grammar, more context) FBI warning on AI-enabled phishing IC3 PSA on generative AI fraud/phishing
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Generate polymorphic malware variations faster OpenAI threat intelligence reports (malicious use examples)
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Automate recon and social engineering Europol “ChatGPT report” (misuse overview)
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Scale attempts cheaply
So defenders adopting AI isn’t optional long-term. It’s more like… you’re bringing a flashlight because the other side just got night-vision goggles. Clumsy metaphor. Still kind of true.
Also, attackers will target the AI systems themselves:
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Prompt injection into security copilots OWASP LLM01: Prompt Injection
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Data poisoning to skew models UK AI Cyber Security Code of Practice
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Adversarial examples to evade detection MITRE ATLAS
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Model extraction attempts in some setups MITRE ATLAS
Security has always been cat-and-mouse. AI just makes the cats faster and the mice more inventive 🐭
The real answer: AI replaces tasks, not accountability ✅
This is the “awkward middle” most teams land in:
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AI handles scale
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Humans handle stakes
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Together they handle speed plus judgment
In my own testing across security workflows, AI is best when it’s treated like:
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A triage assistant
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A summarizer
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A correlation engine
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A policy helper
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A code-review buddy for risky patterns
AI is worst when it’s treated like:
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An oracle
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A single point of truth
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A “set it and forget it” defense system
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A reason to under-staff the team (this one bites later… hard)
It’s like hiring a guard dog that also writes emails. Great. But sometimes it barks at the vacuum and misses the guy hopping the fence. 🐶🧹
Comparison Table (top options teams use day to day) 📊
Below is a practical comparison table - not perfect, a little uneven, like real life.
| Tool / Platform | Best for (audience) | Price vibe | Why it works (and quirks) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft Sentinel Microsoft Learn | SOC teams living in Microsoft ecosystems | $$ - $$$ | Strong cloud-native SIEM patterns; lots of connectors, can get noisy if untuned… |
| Splunk Splunk Enterprise Security | Larger orgs with heavy logging + custom needs | $$$ (often $$$$ frankly) | Powerful search + dashboards; amazing when curated, painful when nobody owns data hygiene |
| Google Security Operations Google Cloud | Teams wanting managed-scale telemetry | $$ - $$$ | Good for big data scale; depends on integration maturity, like many things |
| CrowdStrike Falcon CrowdStrike | Endpoint-heavy orgs, IR teams | $$$ | Strong endpoint visibility; great detection depth, but you still need people to drive response |
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Microsoft Learn | M365-heavy orgs | $$ - $$$ | Tight Microsoft integration; can be great, can be “700 alerts in the queue” if misconfigured |
| Palo Alto Cortex XSOAR Palo Alto Networks | Automation-focused SOCs | $$$ | Playbooks reduce toil; requires care or you automate disorder (yes that’s a thing) |
| Wiz Wiz Platform | Cloud security teams | $$$ | Strong cloud visibility; helps prioritize risk quickly, still needs governance behind it |
| Snyk Snyk Platform | Dev-first orgs, AppSec | $$ - $$$ | Developer-friendly workflows; success depends on dev adoption, not just scanning |
A small note: no tool “wins” on its own. The best tool is the one your team uses daily without resenting it. That’s not science, that’s survival 😅
A realistic operating model: how teams win with AI 🤝
If you want AI to meaningfully improve security, the playbook is usually:
Step 1: Use AI to reduce toil
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Alert enrichment summaries
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Ticket drafting
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Evidence collection checklists
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Log query suggestions
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“What changed” diffs on configs
Step 2: Use humans to validate and decide
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Confirm impact and scope
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Choose containment actions
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Coordinate cross-team fixes
Step 3: Automate the safe stuff
Good automation targets:
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Quarantining known-bad files with high confidence
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Resetting credentials after verified compromise
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Blocking obviously malicious domains
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Enforcing policy drift correction (carefully)
Risky automation targets:
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Auto-isolating production servers without safeguards
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Deleting resources based on uncertain signals
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Blocking large IP ranges because “the model felt like it” 😬
Step 4: Feed lessons back into controls
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Post-incident tuning
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Improved detections
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Better asset inventory (the eternal pain)
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Narrower privileges
This is where AI helps a lot: summarizing postmortems, mapping detection gaps, turning disorder into repeatable improvements.
The hidden risks of AI-driven security (yes, there are a few) ⚠️
If you’re adopting AI heavily, you need to plan for the gotchas:
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Invented certainty
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Security teams need evidence, not storytelling. AI likes storytelling. NIST AI RMF 1.0
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Data leakage
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Prompts can accidentally include sensitive details. Logs are full of secrets if you look closely. OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
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Over-reliance
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People stop learning fundamentals because the copilot “always knows”… until it doesn’t.
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Model drift
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Environments change. Attack patterns change. Detections rot quietly. NIST AI RMF 1.0
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Adversarial abuse
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Attackers will try to steer, confuse, or exploit AI-based workflows. Guidelines for Secure AI System Development (NSA/CISA/NCSC-UK)
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It’s like building a very smart lock and then leaving the key under the mat. The lock isn’t the only problem.
So… Can AI replace Cybersecurity: a clean answer 🧼
Can AI replace Cybersecurity
It can replace a lot of the repetitive work inside cybersecurity. It can accelerate detection, triage, analysis, and even parts of response. But it can’t fully replace the discipline because cybersecurity is not a single task - it’s governance, architecture, human behavior, incident leadership, and continuous adaptation.
If you want the most candid framing (a little blunt, sorry):
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AI replaces busywork
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AI enhances good teams
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AI exposes bad processes
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Humans remain responsible for risk and reality
And yes, some roles will shift. Entry-level tasks will change fastest. But new tasks appear too: prompt-safe workflows, model validation, security automation engineering, detection engineering with AI-assisted tooling… the work doesn’t vanish, it mutates 🧬
Closing notes and quick recap 🧾✨
If you’re deciding what to do with AI in security, here’s the practical takeaway:
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Use AI to compress time - faster triage, faster summaries, faster correlation.
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Keep humans for judgment - context, tradeoffs, leadership, accountability.
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Assume attackers are using AI too - design for deception and manipulation. MITRE ATLAS Guidelines for Secure AI System Development (NSA/CISA/NCSC-UK)
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Don’t buy “magic” - buy workflows that measurably reduce risk and toil.
So yes, AI can replace chunks of the job, and it often does so in ways that feel subtle at first. The winning move is to make AI your leverage, not your replacement.
And if you’re worried about your career - focus on the parts AI struggles with: systems thinking, incident leadership, architecture, and being the person who can tell the difference between “interesting alert” and “we’re about to have a very bad day.” 😄🔐
FAQ
Can AI replace cybersecurity teams completely?
AI can take over sizeable portions of cybersecurity work, but not the discipline end to end. It excels at repetitive throughput tasks such as alert clustering, anomaly detection, and drafting first-pass summaries. What it does not replace is accountability, business context, and judgment when stakes are high. In practice, teams settle into an “awkward middle” where AI delivers scale and speed, while humans retain ownership of consequential decisions.
Where does AI already replace day-to-day SOC work?
In many SOCs, AI already takes on time-heavy work like triage, de-duplication, and ranking alerts by likely impact. It can also accelerate log analysis by flagging patterns that drift from baseline behavior. The result is not fewer incidents by magic - it is fewer hours spent wading through noise, so analysts can focus on investigations that matter.
How do AI tools help with vulnerability management and patch prioritization?
AI helps shift vulnerability management from “too many CVEs” to “what should we patch first here.” A common approach combines exploit likelihood signals (like EPSS), known exploitation lists (like CISA’s KEV catalog), and your environment context (internet exposure and asset criticality). Done well, this reduces guesswork and supports patching without breaking the business.
What makes a “good” AI in cybersecurity versus noisy AI?
Good AI in cybersecurity reduces noise rather than producing confident-sounding clutter. It offers practical explainability - concrete clues like what changed, what it observed, and why it matters - instead of long, vague narratives. It also integrates with core systems (IAM, endpoint, cloud, ticketing) and supports human override so analysts can correct, tune, or ignore it when needed.
What parts of cybersecurity does AI struggle to replace?
AI struggles most with the socio-technical work: risk appetite, incident command, and cross-team coordination. During incidents, the work often becomes communication, evidence handling, legal concerns, and decision-making under uncertainty - areas where leadership outranks pattern-matching. AI can help summarize logs or draft timelines, but it does not reliably replace ownership under pressure.
How are attackers using AI, and does that change the defender’s job?
Attackers use AI to scale phishing, generate more convincing social engineering, and iterate on malware variants faster. That shifts the playing field: defenders adopting AI becomes less optional over time. It also adds new risk, because attackers may target AI workflows through prompt injection, poisoning attempts, or adversarial evasion - meaning AI systems need security controls too, not blind trust.
What are the biggest risks of relying on AI for security decisions?
A major risk is invented certainty: AI can sound confident even when it is wrong, and confidence is not a control. Data leakage is another common pitfall - security prompts can inadvertently include sensitive details, and logs often contain secrets. Over-reliance can also erode fundamentals, while model drift quietly degrades detections as environments and attacker behavior change.
What’s a realistic operating model for using AI in cybersecurity?
A practical model looks like this: use AI to reduce toil, keep humans for validation and decisions, and automate only the safe stuff. AI is strong for enrichment summaries, ticket drafting, evidence checklists, and “what changed” diffs. Automation fits best for high-confidence actions like blocking known-bad domains or resetting credentials after verified compromise, with safeguards to prevent overreach.
Will AI replace entry-level cybersecurity roles, and what skills become more valuable?
Entry-level task heaps are likely to shift fastest because AI can absorb repetitive triage, summarization, and classification work. But new tasks appear too, such as building prompt-safe workflows, validating model outputs, and engineering security automation. Career resilience tends to come from skills AI struggles with: systems thinking, architecture, incident leadership, and translating technical signals into business decisions.
References
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FIRST - EPSS (FIRST) - first.org
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Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) - Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog - cisa.gov
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National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) - SP 800-40 Rev. 4 (Enterprise Patch Management) - csrc.nist.gov
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National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) - AI RMF 1.0 - nvlpubs.nist.gov
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OWASP - LLM01: Prompt Injection - genai.owasp.org
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UK Government - Code of practice for the cyber security of AI - gov.uk
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National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) - SP 800-61 (Incident Handling Guide) - csrc.nist.gov
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) - FBI warns of increasing threat of cyber criminals utilising artificial intelligence - fbi.gov
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FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) - IC3 PSA on generative AI fraud/phishing - ic3.gov
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OpenAI - OpenAI threat intelligence reports (malicious use examples) - openai.com
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Europol - Europol “ChatGPT report” (misuse overview) - europol.europa.eu
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MITRE - MITRE ATLAS - mitre.org
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OWASP - OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications - owasp.org
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National Security Agency (NSA) - Guidance for Securing AI System Development (NSA/CISA/NCSC-UK and partners) - nsa.gov
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Microsoft Learn - Microsoft Sentinel overview - learn.microsoft.com
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Splunk - Splunk Enterprise Security - splunk.com
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Google Cloud - Google Security Operations - cloud.google.com
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CrowdStrike - CrowdStrike Falcon platform - crowdstrike.com
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Microsoft Learn - Microsoft Defender for Endpoint - learn.microsoft.com
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Palo Alto Networks - Cortex XSOAR - paloaltonetworks.com
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Wiz - Wiz Platform - wiz.io
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Snyk - Snyk Platform - snyk.io